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COMMENTS
BITTER FREEDOM:
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND
THE HOMELESS
They both knew intimately the etiquette, the taboos, the protocol of
bums. By their talk to each other they understood that they shareda
belief in the brotherhoodof the desolate;yet in the scars of their eyes
they confirmed that no such fraternity had ever existed, that the only
brotherhoodthey belonged to was the one that asked that enduring
question: How do I get through the next twenty minutes?'
The plight of the homeless in America has taken on new significance as
one of the major urban social issues of the 1980's. Whether the increased
public awareness of the homeless situation is a result of the battle over the
closing and relocation of the shelter run by Mitch Snyder and the Community for Creative Non-Violence ("CCNV") in Washington, D.C., or a result
of the simple presence of homeless men and women in our cities, the problem of urban homelessness has aroused the curiosity and compassion of the
American public. It has also raised many important questions for courts
and legislatures to consider, questions regarding the causes and prevention
of homelessness and questions regarding the adequacy of society's response
to this problem at the federal, state, and local levels.
One sub-population of the homeless, deinstitutionalized mental patients,
has become the particular object of legislative and professional scrutiny in
the search for at least a partial solution to the homeless problem. The federal government, the judicial system, and the psychiatric community have
begun to re-evaluate therapy and release strategies, collectively known as
"deinstitutionalization," 2 that have been utilized in releasing mental patients
1. W. KENNEDY, IRONWEED 23 (1983).

2. The normative definition of deinstitutionalization offered by an unpublished 1977 report from the Government Accounting Office ("GAO") is:
[T]he process of (1) preventing both unnecessary admission to and retention in institutions, (2) finding and developing appropriate alternatives in the community for
housing, treatment, training, education, and rehabilitation of the mentally disabled
who do not need to be in institutions, and (3) improving conditions, care, and treatment for those who need institutional care. This approach is based on the principle
that mentally disabled persons are entitled to live in the least restrictive environment
necessary and lead their lives as normally and independently as they can.
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from state mental institutions. Unfortunately, many of these patients are
unable to provide for themselves outside of the institutional environment.
As a result, it is claimed that large numbers of former mental patients are
now homeless. 3
This re-evaluation involves taking a hard look at some of the basic premises and policies that have been the foundation of the deinstitutionalization
movement. Is the ideal of treatment in the "least restrictive setting," the
cornerstone of deinstitutionalization, 4 still a valid therapy strategy? What
has been the impact of homelessness upon the commitment and release strategies of state mental institutions? Finally, should scarce mental health resources be expended on establishing an outpatient community support
system aimed at the prevention of homelessness among the non-institutionalized mentally ill, or should the effort be aimed at helping those existing at
the shelter level? This comment shall probe these questions and posit that
although much attention has been given to providing the most basic and
rudimentary care for the homeless at the shelter level, the only true humane
solution to the problem of homelessness among the mentally ill in America is
a renewed commitment to the establishment of community mental health
centers aimed at the prevention of homelessness, not just an alleviation of its
symptoms.
I.

THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZED HOMELESS: THE SCOPE AND NATURE
OF THE POPULATION.

The exact number of homeless persons in America is unknown. Informed
estimates range from a figure of 250,000 reported by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"),5 to a dramatically larger figure
of 3,000,000 offered by the Community for Creative Non-Violence. 6 Walter
Fauntroy, Congressional Delegate from the District of Columbia, estimates
that there are 12,000 homeless persons in the District of Columbia alone.7
Reprinted in P. LERMAN, DEINST1TUTIONALIZATION:

A CROSS PROBLEM ANALYSIS 2

(1981).
3. See infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
4. See Mental Health Systems Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9501(1)(A)(ii) (1982). See generally
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School, 446 F. Supp.
1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977); N.Y. State v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
5. Based on an estimate that between 250,000 and 350,000 persons were homeless on an
average night in December 1983 and January 1984. H.R. REP. No. 47, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1985).
6. Based on an estimate that during the winter of 1984 between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000
persons were homeless each night. Id.
7. Evans, Experts Decry Dumping ofMental Patients, Wash. Post, Mar. 20, 1985, at C6,
col. 2.
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Of this population, the number said to be suffering from mental illness
also varies. The National Institute of Mental Health ("NIMH") estimates
that fifty percent of the homeless may have "severe mental disorders."' 8 A
1981 study by the New York State Office of Mental Health of Manhattan

shelters reported that seventy-five percent of those surveyed suffered some
form of mental illness, including thirty-seven percent who were alcoholics
and nineteen percent who were diagnosed as schizophrenic. 9 Tim Siegel of
the Coalition for the Homeless, an advocacy group for the homeless in the
greater-Washington, D.C. area, estimates that in the District of Columbia
seventy to ninety percent of the homeless women and fifteen to fifty percent
of the homeless men suffer from some form of mental illness. 10
While these estimates may appear broad, they uniformly indicate that a
major portion of the homeless population is mentally ill. Perhaps most significant, however, is a caveat to these figures suggested in a recent House of
Representatives report " advising that any estimates (and, specifically, the
NIMH estimates) of mental illness among the homeless should be revised
upwards: "the very state of homelessness can cause varying degrees of
8. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 5, at 4.
9. Nelson, Nation's PsychiatristsGive "High Priority" to the Homeless, N.Y. Times, May
10, 1983, at C2, col. 2.
10. Guillermoprieto & Alma, Streets Called "Asylums of the '80's" at Conference on
Homeless, Wash. Post, Apr. 26, 1984, at D3, col. 2. A 1983 report by New York Governor
Mario Cuomo to the National Governor's Association Task Force on the Homeless stated the
following findings from several cities:
In New York City: estimates of those who are severely disabled and/or are ex-mental
patients among the homeless range from a low of 20% to a high of 66% in one study
of a probably atypical sheltered population. The safest, most commonly reported
figure is about a third.
In Albany, outreach workers report 38% of the homeless contacted have significant
psychiatric problems.
In Phoenix, the estimate of the "severely mentally disturbed" among the three hundred and forty-five of the city's homeless interviewed in two shelters ... is put conservatively at 20%, since more of these individuals tend to refuse interviews than any
other group.
In Boston, a clinical evaluation of 78 men and women in a public shelter.., found
that 39.5% of them show signs of "major mental illness," and a third of the total had
been previously hospitalized.
In San Francisco,a study by the Department of Psychiatry at San Francisco General
Hospital estimated that seven hundred of the city's four thousand homeless were
chronically mentally disabled.
1933-1983 - Never Again, a Report to the National Governor's Association Task Force on the
Homeless, reprinted in Homelessness in America - I: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development of the House Comm. on Banking, Financeand Urban Affairs,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 398 (1984) (footnotes omitted) (statement of Mario Cuomo, Governor of
New York).
11. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 5.
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mental illness in relatively short periods, there may be even larger percentages of the homeless who are mentally ill ....
What portion of the mentally ill homeless is made up of deinstitutionalized mental patients? Again, as could be expected, the figures differ. For
example, Delegate Fauntroy estimates that half of the homeless in Washington, D.C. are deinstitutionalized mental patients.1 3 A 1983 study in New
York of Bellevue Hospital's psychiatric emergency service revealed that
96.6% of the sample had previous psychiatric hospitalization. 4 However,
one of the authors of the report, Dr. Steven E. Katz, warned that these
figures may overstate the problem because the sample included only homeless persons seeking mental help and not the homeless population as a
whole.'" Still, a recent article in Newsweek cites only a sixty-five percent
success rate among released mental patients in adapting to the outside
world, 1 6 although no mention is made of the ultimate fate of the thirty-five
percent who were unsuccessful.
Another aspect of deinstitutionalization is the restrictions placed on the
number of patients admitted to state mental institutions. This has created
another class of mentally ill homeless: persons who previously would have
been committed to a hospital but now have no place to go.' 7 While the size
of this population has not been quantified, a recent congressional report
agrees that restrictions on admissions to state mental hospitals have contrib8
uted to the number of mentally ill homeless.'
The increased presence of former mental patients and those who would
previously have been institutionalized among the homeless is reflected in a
demographic shift within the homeless population over the last ten years.
The 1981 Manhattan shelter study found the median age of their sample
population to be thirty-six and getting younger."' Ten years earlier the median age had been forty-one,2" with the majority of that population being
comprised of older alcoholics. 2' These findings correlate with the results of
a similar study of 560 persons in eleven cities conducted by Harvey A. Siegal
12. Id. at 4-5.
13. See Evans, supra note 7.
14. Nelson, Mental Illness Cited Among Many Homeless, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1983, at 25,

col. 2.
15. Id.
16. Morganthau, Agrest, Greenberg, Doherty & Raine, Abandoned, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 6,
1986, at
17.
18.
19.

14, col. 2 [hereinafter Morganthau].
Nelson, supra note 9; H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 5, at 4.
H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 5.
Nelson, supra note 9.

20. Id.
21. Id.
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and James A. Inciardi.22
There have also been noticeable changes in the social and economic background of today's homeless. The 1983 Bellevue Hospital study found that
fourteen percent of the homeless surveyed were college graduates,2 3 with
another twenty percent being high school graduates or having some college
background.2" The parents of thirty-one percent of the men in the 1981
Manhattan shelter study were classified as being in the middle or upper social and economic classes. 25 Finally, the Siegal and Inciardi study noted a
stronger representation of ethnic minorities among the homeless, a jump
from twenty-two percent in 195026 to forty-two percent in the 1970's,27 in
what had been almost exclusively a white population.
This shift in the demographics of the homeless population marks the displacement of the "traditional" skid row inhabitant, the older white male alcoholic, 28 by persons who are younger and more mentally disturbed.2 9 One
may conclude, as did Siegal and Inciardi,3 ° that an explanation of this phenomenon is that there has been a shift over time of the psychological makeup of the homeless: "[e]ven though these people are physically on skid row,
they're socially and psychologically different than the skid rowers we are
used to."' 3 1 Logically, it follows that one reason for this change in the psychological and social profile of the homeless has been the influx of former
mental patients into the community as a result of the drastic reduction in the
state mental institution population over the last thirty years.3 2 Releasing
22. Siegal & Inciardi, The Demise of Skid Row,

SOCIETY, Jan. - Feb. 1982, at 39.
23. Nelson, supra note 9, at C2, col. 3.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Siegal & Inciardi, supra note 22, at 44.
27. Id.
28. For a fascinating survey of the history and decline of the traditional skid row, see
Siegal & Inciardi, supra note 22, at 44. The term "skid row" came from a street in Seattle,
Washington, where logs were dragged ("skidded") down the street to a saw mill. The street
was primarily inhabited by unemployed and homeless lumberjacks. According to the study, a
hobo is a migratory worker, a tramp is a migratory non-worker, and a bum is a stationary nonworker. Id.
29. Nelson, supra note 9, at C2, col. 4.
30. Siegal & Inciardi, supra note 22, at 44.
31. Id.
32. The General Accounting Office ("GAO") estimates that between 1955 and 1980, the
population in state mental institutions decreased by more than 75%, from 559,000 to 138,000,
even though the total U.S. population increased significantly over this period. H.R. REP. No.
47, supra note 5, at 4. Interestingly, the institutionalized population in private mental hospitals
(such as nursing homes) has actually increased. From 1968 to 1975, NIMH estimates the
number of private admissions increased by about 34%, and the one day resident counts increased by 10%. M. BURT & K. PITTMAN, TESTING THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET 646-66 (1985);
P. LERMAN, supra note 2, at 3. Finally, even though the patient populations in mental hospi-
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mental patients into the general population 33 and limiting the availability of
treatment for prospective patients by tightening the criteria for admission
into state mental hospitals3 4 has placed in the community a population that
has a high risk of becoming homeless, the mentally ill. And, as the figures
show, that risk has taken its toll.
II. O'CONNOR V. DONALDSON: TEN YEARS LATER

-

NEW QUESTIONS

In 1975 the Supreme Court decided O'Connorv. Donaldson,35 which effectively outlines the purposes for which a state may constitutionally justify the
continued confinement of a mental patient.36 The Court based its holding on
the premise that a determination of mental illness alone is not a sufficient
justification for retaining a person in a state mental institution:
A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's locking
up a person against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple
custodial confinement. Assuming that term [mental illness] can be
given a reasonably precise content and that the "mentally ill" can
be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are
dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.37
The Court in O'Connor went on to recognize a constitutional right to freedom applicable to institutionalized mental patients, 38 and held that a state
may not continue to confine such individuals without a finding that they
could not survive safely in freedom either by themselves or with the help of
willing and responsible family members or friends.39 This right to freedom
appears to involve the whole spectrum of constitutional rights attached to
the concept of personal liberty and suggests that, absent a showing of danger
to self or others, a mental patient has a right to enjoy these liberties.
While few would argue with the intuitive correctness of such a holding,
some question the necessity of emphasizing these freedoms in a situation
tals has decreased, the staff-per-patient ratio has actually increased, reflecting that staff reductions in mental hospitals have not kept pace with patient reductions. Morganthau, supra note

16.
33. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 5, at 4.
34. Id.
35. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
36. For a fascinating account of the internal politics and personal motives within the
Supreme Court that helped shape the O'Connor decision, see B. WOODWARD & S. ARM-

369-83 (1979).
37. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
38. Id. at 576.
39. Presumably, the Court has recognized this right to freedom in connection with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, as it is not an enumerated right.
STRONG, THE BRETHREN
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where continuing mental illness renders a patient incapable of enjoying these
rights:
The problem with this approach is its unquestioning assignment of
value to the primary rights affected by commitment. On one hand,
if the illness has no effect on, say, the schizophrenic's competence
to vote, the state would show more respect for his constitutional
right by providing an absentee ballot than it would by providing
treatment leading to an earlier release. On the other hand, it is
difficult to see how the inmate has a fundamental right to those
freedoms affected by his illness - in the case of one who believes
he is radioactive and shuns all contact with other human beings,
for example, freedom of association or interests related to sexual
relations. If he is unable to make rational choices regarding such
matters, he is "free" before commitment only in the descriptive
sense that he is subject to no governmental constraint. 4°
There are several false assumptions in such logic. First, it assumes that constitutional rights are worthy of protection only if those who hold them are
medically or mentally capable of enjoying them. Generally, the law recognizes no such qualification to a person's constitutional rights.4 Such reasoning would import that the protection of a person's constitutional rights is
dependent upon the vagaries of a psycho-medical determination of their ability to enjoy and utilize them, an inexact science at best. Second, while the
author of this passage, Professor Garvey, claims that one may overestimate
the value of this constitutional right to freedom in the case of the mentally
ill, he underestimates the value of freedom from governmental constraint to
the inmate, especially where conditions within the mental institution are
substandard.4 2
However, there is some indication that the Court is willing to consider
such qualifications regarding the constitutional rights of mental patients. In
Addington v. Texas, 43 a case considering the burden of proof necessary to
justify commitment, the Court commented that mental illness could render a
deprivation of constitutional rights less odious because of the debility
involved:
[M]oreover, it is not true that the release of a genuinely mentally ill
person is no worse for the individual than the failure to convict the
guilty. One who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and
40. Garvey, Freedom and Choice in ConstitutionalLaw, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1756, 1789
n.140 (1981).
41. For a general discussion in this area, see Garvey, supra note 40, at 1758-62; see also
note 78 and accompanying text.
42. Garvey, supra note 40, at 1758-62.
43. 441 U.S. 418 (1978).
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in need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of
stigma. 44
As shall be discussed later, perhaps the foundation underlying this stance is
the idea or ethic that in the case of the mentally ill, a court should take a
paternalistic stance emphasizing actions that would facilitate the treatment
of mental illness, rather than protect a patient's civil rights.4 5
The Court's subsequent treatment of the liberty interest of mental patients
recognized in O'Connor in terms of substantive and procedural rights has
been more fully treated in Mills v. Rogers.46 Essentially, Mills held that the
rights outlined in O'Connor represent only the bare minimum that a state
must provide to a mental patient, both substantively and procedurally. State
law may recognize rights more extensive than those protected by the Federal
Constitution:
Because state-created liberty interests are entitled to the protection
of the federal Due Process Clause, the full scope of a patient's due
process rights may depend in part on the substantive liberty interests that extend beyond those minimally required by the Constitution of the United States. If a state does so, the minimal
requirements of the Federal Constitution [as outlined by O'Connor]
would not be controlling, and would not need to be identified in
order to determine the legal rights and duties of persons within the
State.47
The possibility of heightened legal deference to the mentally ill, and by
extension the mentally ill homeless, as a class is doubtful. A recent case,
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,48 involving city zoning restrictions that prevented a group from operating a housing project for the mentally retarded, essentially precludes arguing that the rights of the mentally ill
should receive heightened judicial scrutiny and protection by categorizing
them as a "suspect class." The Court specifically held that mental retardation is not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, meaning that laws relating to that group need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest
to be constitutional.4 9 While clinically and medically there is a distinction
between the mentally retarded and the mentally ill, there is no room to distinguish Cleburne on the grounds that the Court was considering the mentally retarded, not the mentally ill. Justice White's majority opinion clearly
44. Addington, 441 U.S. at 428.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
457 U.S. 291 (1982).
Id. at 299.
105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
Id. at 3255-58.
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sets the ground rules for arguments that the Court will entertain in this area
in the future:
[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were
deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by the court of appeals,
it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety
of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting
them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired
legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice
from at least part of the public at large. One need mention in this
respect on the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm.
We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do
0
so.

5

Setting itself against the potential avalanche of suspect classifications posed
by the situation in Cleburne, the Court left the question of whether mental
retardation would become a suspect classification to the legislatures, where
the Court evidently believes the issue should be decided. Citing the
landmark case Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,5 ' the Court
reminds us that:
[T]he lesson of Murgia is that where individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the state has the authority to implement, the courts have been
very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with
our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued. In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause
requires only a rational means to serve a legitimate end.5 2
Weakness in the Court's logic is ironically illuminated by the Murgia case
itself. Justice White refers to a passage from Murgia to the effect that the
Court declined to extend heightened review to differential treatment based
on age because the aged "have not experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities." 5 3 By specifically
citing this section, the Cleburne Court infers that the mentally retarded also
have not been discriminated against on the basis of false stereotypes, a conclusion that is radically at odds with the history of treatment of the mentally
retarded in this country.5 4
50. Id. at 3257-58.
51. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
52. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255.
53. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
54. For a discussion of this point, see Torari, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center:
Equal Protectionfor the Mentally Retarded?, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 231 (1986).
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But perhaps more important is that Cleburne could be a signal from the
Court that the impetus and direction in shaping social policy in the area of
mental health should come from Congress and the state legislatures, and not
the judiciary. If this is the case, O'Connorand its progeny may have become
the high-water mark in defining the rights of mental patients: for as long as
the mentally ill remain a non-suspect class, restrictive and possibly quasidiscriminatory laws relating to the mentally ill can pass muster as long as the
proposed statute is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
The possibilities are endless. Future measures could include toughening up
state commitment statutes defining what types of behavior exhibited by the
mentally ill constitute a "danger" to self and others. Additionally, zoning
codes could be made more restrictive to exclude group houses and mental
health centers, as was done in Cleburne. For while the court in Cleburne
knocked down the zoning restrictions at issue, the court did not per se rule
out restrictive zoning in relation to group homes. Health benefits, employment practices - in short any law relating to the mentally ill - could be
affected by the lesser standard of review. The full impact of Cleburne remains to be seen.
Living Safely: New Issues in the Context of Homelessness
The O'Connor standard that a mental patient must be able to "live safely
in freedom"" in order to gain release from an institution opens many areas
of discussion regarding a released mental patient's potential for homelessness. The concept of "living safely" relates to the danger to himself and to
others posed by the effects of a patient's mental illness, and his lifestyle and
standard of living subsequent to release. 56 State statutes regarding commitment or continued confinement based upon a showing of danger to the patient or the public often incorporate definitions of dangerous behavior within
the statute itself.57 This guidance is often supplemented by a professional
55. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
56. The Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana noted:

The bases [for the justification of involuntary civil commitments by the state] that
have been articulated include dangerousness to self, dangerousness to others, and the

need for care or treatment or training. Considering the number of persons affected, it
is perhaps remarkable that the substantive constitutional limitations on this power
have not been more frequently litigated.
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (citations omitted).

57. An example of this is the Pennsylvania statute. It is particularly explicit. While naturally the statute includes under "danger to self" the risk of suicide or self-mutilation, the
statute is very clear as to the danger posed by less immediate threats, requiring a finding that

the:
[P]erson has acted in such manner as to evidence that he would be unable, without
care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need for nour-
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psychiatric evaluation of the patient.
When a state justifies the continued commitment of a mental patient based
upon danger posed to the public at large, the state invokes its "police powers" to protect its citizens from harm or trauma.5 8 A key consideration in
the decision to commit or release a mental patient is the kind of harm to the
public that the relevant statute, or subsequent judicial interpretation, seeks
to prevent. In a 1961 District of Columbia case, Overholser v. Russel,5 9 the
court interpreted "dangerousness" in the then-current civil commitment
statute6° to include the commission of any criminal act, not just violent
ones. 6 1 In this case the criminal act was passing a bad check. For the mentally ill homeless, such an interpretation of what constitutes "dangerous behavior" could result in commitment if, for example, they were convicted of
violating a vagrancy statute. Since violating the law - any law - is regarded as dangerous behavior, this situation would meet the constitutional
requirement mandated by O'Connorthat a mentally ill person pose a danger
to himself or others before they legitimately could be confined.
The concept of dangerousness to self invokes the parenspatriaepower of a
state to prevent a citizen from bringing harm to himself. The primary difficulty with this concept involves the imminence of harm to self necessary to
constitute a danger sufficient to justify government intervention.6 2 Must the
danger posed by a patient's behavior have immediate harmful consequences
before the state may act, or could the applicable standard of dangerousness
allow state action where the immediate harm to the patient is small but
where there is a very harmful cumulative effect over time, such as the deleterious effects of slow starvation or malnutrition?
In the ground-breaking case of Lessard v. Schmidt,6 3 the court defined
dangerousness as a condition where there is an extreme likelihood that if the
ishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety; and there is a
reasonable probability that death, serious bodily injury, or serious physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days, unless adequate treatment were afforded under this

act.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301 (Purdon 1985).
58. Frederick, An Overview of Dangerousness."Its Complexities and Consequences, in DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH 9 (C. Frederick ed. 1978).

59. 283 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See also Fhagan v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d
615, 328 N.Y.S.2d 393, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972).
60. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. VII 1959).

61. Overholser, 283 F.2d at 198.
62. See generally Brooks, Notes on Defining the "Dangerousness" of the Mentally Ill, in
DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH 37-60 (C. Frederick

ed. 1978).
63. 349 F. Supp 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), remanded 414 U.S. 473 (1973).
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person is not confined, he will do immediate harm to himself or others." On
remand from the Supreme Court, this standard was clarified as meaning
"imminent dangerousness to self or others ...

based, at minimum, upon a

recent act, attempt, or threat to do substantial harm."' 65 The Lessard court
emphasized the need for immediate harm to self or others for an act to be
considered dangerous. In practice, such a standard of dangerousness would
rule out state action where the danger involved is the long-term harm to a
person that would result from malnutrition or exposure to the elements, the
main physical dangers posed by homelessness.
However, in subsequent cases, most significantly State ex rel. Hawks v.
Lazaro66 and Lynch v. Baxley, 67 courts have taken the position that the danger posed by a slow deterioration that leads to death, such as through starvation or bodily neglect, could justify state intervention. With such a standard,
the harm suffered by an individual need not be immediate or imminent to
invoke the state's parenspatriaepower. This trend away from a requirement
of immediate harm is reflected in O'Connor, where the Court noted that:
"even if there is no forseeable risk of self-injury or suicide, a person is literally 'dangerous to himself' if for physical or other reasons he is helpless to
avoid the hazards of freedom either through his own efforts or with the aid
of willing family members or friends."6
During the winter of 1986, the question of danger to self became the focus
of attention regarding the rights of homeless persons in New York City.
There, Mayor Ed Koch granted police officers an expanded power to detain
homeless persons whom they deemed not properly protected against the
cold, and possibly to cause their subsequent commitment to a mental institution. 69 As a rule, the police in New York are empowered to detain anyone
who appears mentally ill and is conducting himself in a manner "likely to
result in serious harm to himself or others."7 ° In past winters this power to
detain has been invoked against those inadequately bundled against the
freezing temperatures only on the coldest nights of the year, when the dan64. Id. at 1093.
65. Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (E.D. Wis. 1974). It is noteworthy that
Newsweek has reported a movement in Wisconsin, the state where Lessard was decided, to

broaden the "danger" standard and allow involuntary commitment for the "obviously mentally ill." Morganthau, supra note 16, at 19, col. 2.
66. 157 W. Va. 417, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974).
67. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
68. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 564, 574 n.9 (1975).
69. Barbanel, Homeless in City FacingKoch Edict, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at Al, col.
3. For a suggestion of similar action by the Washington, D.C. police, see Engel, Barry Urged
to Use Police to Get Homeless Into Shelters, Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
70. Barbanel, supra note 69, at Al, col. 3.
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ger posed by staying out-of-doors is most acute.7 During the winter of
1986, however, the Mayor authorized police to detain those endangered by
the cold when the temperature dropped below thirty-two degrees Fahrenheit. Detentions potentially could occur far more often than under the former "coldest nights" standard. 72 Those thought to be properly bundled
against the cold were not to be disturbed.73 If the detained person did not
have recourse to a shelter, the officer was then instructed to call a supervisor
and have the person ordered to a hospital, where he would be examined by a
psychiatrist. 74 The psychiatrist would then make a determination if the person was to be released or admitted to the hospital. 75 The detainee would
then be afforded the right to a lawyer and be bound over for a hearing before
a judge.7 6 An ironic twist is that the New York Civil Liberties Union
mounted its own "Freeze Patrol" in an effort to inform the homeless of their
right to resist this type of treatment.77
Value Judgments on Lifestyle: May a Person Prefer Homelessness
and Still Gain Release?
One could conclude from the implications of judicial policy regarding
danger to self that homelessness or the potential for homelessness could
cause the commitment of a homeless person or bar a patient's release from a
mental institution. Such conclusions, however accurate in practice, must be
tempered somewhat by a statement in O'Connor that would place an upper
limit on the extent to which a state can justify invoking its parens patriae
power to "improve" a patient's lifestyle or standard of living:
May the state confine the mentally ill merely to ensure them a living standard superior to that they enjoy in the private community?
That the state has a proper interest in providing care and assistance
to the unfortunate goes without saying. But the mere presence of
mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his
home to the comforts of an institution. Moreover, while the state
may arguably confine a person to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the living
standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their
own or with the help of family or friends.7 8
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at BI1, col 4.
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Morganthau, supra note 16, at 19, col. 1.
78. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 564, 575 (1975).
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The distinction between what constitutes the permissible state objective of
preventing harm to a patient or others, and the impermissible state objective
of institutionalizing a person to raise their standard of living becomes crucial
when one realizes the complexity of issues posed by the condition of homelessness. At what point does the prevention of harm end and social engineering by the state begin? Could retaining a patient in a mental institution
to prevent him from becoming homeless be considered an improper attempt
by the state to raise a person's standard of living? The issue becomes
whether homelessness is a viable, acceptable, and constitutionally protectable lifestyle for some, or a dangerous behavior that legitimately invokes the
state's parens patriaepower to commit the dangerous mentally ill.
Again, O'Connor serves as the focal point of the analysis. Assuming, arguendo, that the mentally ill could be easily and readily classified as those
truly dangerous to themselves or others and those who demonstrate merely
eccentric or strange behavior, it is clear that there is no constitutionally valid
justification for retention by the state of the benign "oddball":
May the state fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its
citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different? One
might as well ask if the state, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric.
Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty.7 9
The Court appears to recognize a "freedom of lifestyle" only to the point
where the lifestyle in question constitutes a danger. It is not difficult conceptually to accept that homelessness, such as in the form of vagabondage, 8 °
would be classified as "socially eccentric" behavior.8" If it could be proved
that such persons could "live safely" in this fashion, it follows that the
Court's analysis in O'Connor would preclude homelessness as constituting a
bar to release from a state mental hospital, or as causing a person's commit79. Id.
80. Webster defines a vagabondas "one who wanders about from place to place" and "one
who wanders from place to place with no fixed dwelling or if he has one not abiding in it and

who is without visible means of support."
TIONARY 2528 (1981).

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL

DIc-

81. It must be emphasized that homelessness under these circumstances must be the result
of rational choices freely arrived at, and these choices must not be the result of physical and
mental debility. The problem lies in sorting out those who, although mentally ill, have made
free and rational choices to live on the streets, and those who, through affliction by mental
illness, have arrived at that decision impaired by such debility or delusion. It would be immoral to justify denying help to those who are on the streets involuntarily due to mental illness
by claiming they have a right to live on the streets, or that they are in no danger. This "freedom of lifestyle" argument should apply only to those rational enough to make a deliberate
choice for street life.
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ment. However, the psychiatric community has, through its advisory role to
the judiciary during commitment proceedings, effectively ruled out homelessness as a judicially/constitutionally protectable lifestyle. Almost invariably, psychiatrists advising the court find the innocuous-yet-strange behavior
common to street people to be "dangerous," often disregarding the actual
danger posed by the behavior to the individual or to the community. Behav84
83
ior such as wandering, 82 being a vagabond, and eating out of trash cans,

are all characterized as dangerous behavior by psychiatrists during commitment proceedings. Indeed, as one commentator observes:
[L]eft by the courts to their own devices, psychiatrists are prepared
to characterize virtually all deviant behaviors of mentally ill persons as dangerous. Since very few mentally ill persons are
presented for commitment unless their behavior is perceived as
somewhat deviant, the extent to which deviance is equated with
dangerousness85 tends to render the dangerousness standard
meaningless.
While it may be said that O'Connorstands for a reduction in the discretion
allowed the psychiatric community regarding the commitment or retention
of mental patients by requiring a finding of dangerousness, any judicial reliance upon a determination of dangerousness rendered by modern psychiatry
reintroduces into the process an institutional bias of the psychiatric community. That bias favors commitment of the mentally ill for the treatment and
ultimate cure of mental illness - any mental illness - regardless of the
actual danger posed by the individual suffering from the disorder.
There is inherent conflict between the judiciary and the psychiatric profession regarding the disposition of mentally ill homeless. On one side, courts
must protect a patient's constitutional rights as required by O'Connor.8 6 On
82. Brooks, supra note 62, at 42.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 42-43. An extreme example of this misuse of the danger standard is reported by
R. Schwitzgebel:

A 78-year-old female patient was found who had been committed to the Territorial
Asylum for the Insane at Phoenix in 1912, shortly before Arizona became a state.
When committed, she was a 19-year-old who, according to the official records, had
several major "symptoms" which led to her commitment for dangerousness. Among
her "symptoms" were: laughter, singing, a desire to dance, and a willingness to talk

to anyone. These are behaviors not unlike those of a teenage girl who has, as the
saying goes, fallen in love.
Schwitzgebel, Legal and Social Aspects of the Concept of Dangerousness, in DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH 83 (C. Frederick ed. 1978) (citation

omitted).
86. Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the Adversary Process, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 897 (1975).
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the other side is the psychiatric community's conservatism regarding the
characterization of dangerous behavior that underlies an interest in the treatment of mental illness, not the protection of a person's civil rights.8 7 This is
not a passive conflict. Some have postured that while many psychiatrists are
aware of the increasingly restrictive statutory definitions of dangerousness,
they may at times actually "ignore this and manipulate the dangerousness
concept in order to accomplish their treatment objectives." 88 Thus, the
proper functioning of the civil commitment laws are subverted by a type of
clandestine medical activism, at the expense of the patient's civil rights.
While the judiciary may not have the clinical expertise to diagnose and
predict dangerousness in the mentally ill, if the freedoms to mental patients
granted by O'Connorare to mean anything, then the judiciary must guarantee that the psychiatric diagnosis upon which a commitment decision is
based is worthy of such reliance. Judge Bazelon summed up the duty for the
judiciary very well when he stated:
[T]here is a central but limited role for courts in this system - that
role is to guide professional decisionmaking, and may be best described by the familiar model of judicial review of administrative
decisionmaking. Courts must determine whether there has been a
full exploration of all relevant facts, opposing views and possible
alternatives, whether the results of the exploration relate rationally
to the ultimate decision, and whether constitutional and statutory
procedural safeguards have been faithfully observed. Ourfunction
is thus not to determine whether the decisions taken by those
charged with handling disturbed or disturbing individuals are correct or wise - but whether they are rationalin the manner I have
just described89 (emphasis added).
What is necessary is recognition by the judiciary of the institutional biases,
87. Former Chief Judge David L. Bazelon, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and a main participant in the struggle for civil rights for mental
patients, writes:
Courts have traditionally been the protector of individual rights against state power,
and there is no reason why the particularly difficult problems in the area of state
intervention [in the institutionalization or deinstitutionlization of disturbed individuals] are any different. We cannot delegate this responsibility to the medical professions. Those disciplines are, naturally enough, orientated toward helping people by
treating them. Their value system assumes that disturbed or disturbing individuals
need treatment, that medical disciplines can provide it, and that attempts to resist it
are misguided or delusionary. The medical disciplines can no more judge the legitimacy of state intervention into the lives of disturbed or disturbing individuals than a
prosecutor can judge the guilt of a person he has accused.
Bazelon, supra note 86, at 910 (footnotes omitted).
88. Brooks, supra note 62, at 43.
89. Bazelon, supra note 86, at 910 (footnotes omitted).
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judicial as well as psychiatric, at work in the commitment process. There
should be a balance struck between the liberty rights of the mentally ill and
the general welfare of the community (and the individual as a member of
that community) that has an interest in the treatment of mental illness. The
goal should be not only to respect the rights of the citizen to be free from
unnecessary governmental restraint and the right of the community to be
free from dangerous behavior, but also to treat mental illness in order to
preserve the quality of life for society at large, as well as for the individual.
Homelessness or potential homelessness has been treated by the courts (on
the advice of the psychiatric community) as posing a danger to the mentally
ill. It is, for all pratical purposes, a viable justification for the state to commit or retain a patient in a mental institution. Even so, the problems of the
mentally ill homeless do not end here. What of the deinstitutionalized mentally ill currently living in the streets and shelters today despite the psychiatric community's paternalistic view of commitment? The next section will
evaluate the judicial and legislative responses to the growing number of mentally ill homeless on the streets.
III.

PRESENT APPROACHES

To

MENTAL ILLNESS AND HOMELESSNESS

The lame and the haltput their hymnals down joylessly, and Reverend Chester leaned over his lectern to look at tonight's collection.
Among them, as always, were good men and straight, men honestly
without work, victims of a society ravaged by avarice, sloth, stupidity, and a God made wrathful by Babylonian excesses. Such men
were merely the transients in the mission, and to them a preacher
could only wish luck, send prayer,and provide a meal for the long
road ahead. The true targets of the preacher were the others: the
dipsos, the deadbeats, the wetbrains, and the loonies, who needed
more than luck. What they needed was a structured way, a mentor
and guide through the hells and purgatoriesof their days.90
While there is something to be said for abstract discussions regarding the
constitutional rights of mental patients, it can be but cold comfort to a former mental patient who is now homeless to know that while he may take his
meals from a dumpster and sleep on a park bench, he can rest assured that
his very homelessness is a testament to the fact that his civil liberties have
been adequately protected. Indeed, it is ironic that the rigorous protection
of such a person's constitutional rights could result in their homelessness.
One of the reasons for this harsh result is that, in general, most communities
have little in the way of ability, facilities, or desire to take the steps necessary
90. W.

KENNEDY, supra note

1, at 34.
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to successfully absorb the deinstitutionalized mentally ill into the mainstream of their society. More often than not, the deinstitutionalized mental
patient is released into an area lacking the aftercare support structures that
would ensure his successful transition into the community. While homelessness resulting from deinstitutionalization is unfortunate, it should not come
as a surprise because the success of deinstitutl0nalization was predicated on
the presence of aftercare facilities, called comrunity mental health centers,
for the released patient.9' The lack of these-facilities has been cited as a
major factor in the general failure of deinstitutionalization.9 2 While it may
not seem odd to find that two current strategies aimed at combatting homelessness have concentrated on providing services to the homeless at the survival-oriented shelter level and toughening up the standard for releasing
patients from mental hospitals, it is disconcerting that the psychiatric community is still calling for the establishment of community mental health centers twenty years after deinstitutionalization began.93
Shelters for the Homeless
Perhaps the most visible and direct form of aid for the homeless is the
effort to provide for the most basic needs of those on the street: food and
shelter. The majority of this effort is administered and funded locally because officially the federal government does not offically become directly involved in providing money and materials at the shelter level. The
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") has stressed that "the
primary responsibility in helping the homeless lies with local government
and private and/or philanthropic organizations." 9 4 Official policy statements aside, the federal goverment has become involved to a certain extent
in the effort at the shelter level, but not without controversy.
91.

Nelson, supra note 9, at Cl, col. 2. The motivation behind deinstitutionalization is

subject to numerous explanations. First, an anti-institutional ideology has existed among the
American public since the mid-nineteenth century, if not earlier. Americans abhor and fear
the prospect of life in an institution. Second, "fiscal expediency" (i.e. a money crisis) may have
prompted the state move to deinstitutionalize as a way to reduce costs. An example of this is
New York. In the 1960's, New York lagged behind other states in reducing its mental hospital
population. However, deinstitutionalization in New York accelerated (primarily through reduced admissions) in the late 1960's and early 1970's as its financial crisis loomed. Finally, the
advent of deinstitutionalization has been prodded by entrepreneurial state leadership that seeks
to take advantage of federal resources and adapt them to the purpose of deinstitutionalization.
For example, a reduction in New Jersey of its institutionalized mentally retarded was not due
to an assessment of their capabilities for living in the community, but rather it was an attempt
to maximize Medicaid collections for the state. See generally P. LERMAN, supra note 2, at 7987.
92. Nelson, supra note 9, at CI, col. 2.
93. Id.
94. Nelson, supra note 9, at C2, col. 5; H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 5, at 15.
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Although the current federal administration maintains that the shelter effort should be handled at the local level, HHS does provide federal aid for
emergency shelters, in the form of the HHS Homeless Task Force, Federal
Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") grants, and the Community
Services Block Grant ("CSBG"). The latter two programs have funds that
may be used to run shelters.95
95. Department of Health and Human Services, Shelter and Feeding the Homeless, A Resource Guide for Communities 1 (undated), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 47, surpa note 5, at 15.
Most of the recent litigation regarding the homeless has concerned the due process necessary
for a city or government to shut down a homeless shelter. The most celebrated case involves
the proposed closing of the Washington, D.C. shelter run by the Community for Creative
Non-Violence ("CCNV") located in a federally owned building at Second and D Street. Robbins v. Reagan, 616 F. Supp. 1259 (D.D.C.), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 780 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir.
1985). In district court, the judge held that the federal government could not close the facility
until an alternate shelter had been found for the homeless housed there. On appeal, the court
affirmed except to the extent that the lower court imposed requirements on the government
that went beyond the resolution of the dispute at hand. Generally, a government may close a
shelter if it follows proper procedures as set forth in its administrative laws. See Williams v.
Barry, 708 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The following is a chronology of events (as of Mar.,
1986) in the CCNV shelter situation:
1. January 15, 1984: CCNV opens shelter at Second and D Street in Washington,
D.C. in vacant federal building donated for that purpose. Wash. Post, Aug. 20, 1985,
at AI, col. 5.
2. Early 1984: CCNV proposes five-million dollar renovation plan for the shelter,
and asks the federal government to do the work. Id.
3. September 15, 1984: CCNV leader Mitch Snyder begins fast in an attempt to
secure federal renovation of the shelter. Id.
4. November 4, 1984: Health and Human Services Secretary Margaret Heckler tells
Snyder that President Reagan has agreed to make the Second and D Street facility a
"model shelter." Snyder ends his fast. Id.
5. March 18, 1985: GSA estimates cost of the CCNV renovation plan at ten-million dollars. Id.
6. May 30, 1985: Federal government authorizes $2.7 million for repair work on
shelter. Snyder says planned repairs are inadequate. Id.
7. June 17, 1985: CCNV files suit to force the federal government to perform the
proposed renovation. Id.
8. June 21, 1985: Federal government announces plans to close the Second and D
Street shelter, stating that CCNV blocked rehabilitation efforts. Id.
9. August 19, 1985: Judge allows the federal government to close the shelter if
inhabitants are relocated and a long-range plan is devised to eliminate homelessness
in the Nation's Capitol. Id.
10. November 14, 1985: Federal government and D.C. Coalition for the Homeless
open a shelter in Anacostia. Inhabitants at the CCNV Second and D Street shelter
rumored to be preparing armed resistance to a federal eviction. Wash. Post, Nov. 10,
1985, at BI, col. 1; Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
11. December 28, 1985: President Reagan blocks GSA plan to stage an assault on
the CCNV shelter and delays any plans for eviction. Wash. Post, Dec. 29, 1985, at
Al, col. 4.
12. January 3, 1986: Mayor Marion Barry pledges $250,000 for emergency repairs
to CCNV shelter. Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 1986, at Al, col. 2.
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While not primarily designed as a source of money for shelters, the CSBG
may be used to fund various anti-poverty programs, including emergency
shelters. In fiscal year 1983, HHS estimated that twenty percent of these
funds (a total of $60 million) went to support emergency services. 96 However, these figures have not been verified. 97
Congress authorized FEMA to distribute $100 million to groups providing services to the homeless during fiscal years 1983-85. 9 8 The fund is directed to state and local governments, with the remainder being earmarked
for distribution to volunteer groups via an entity called the National
Board.9 9 The Board itself is comprised of representatives from charitable
groups and FEMA. " However, the FEMA grants have several limitations.
First, there are limits placed on the use of the money allocated by the National Board, especially in the area of capital expenditures, such as money
earmarked for improvements on shelter facilities. Generally, there is a cap
on capital expenditures for shelter facilities from this fund of $500 per bed
and $5,000 per building.'
More importantly, however, is that the current
funding of $70 million a year is inadequate to meet the needs of the nation's
homeless. It is estimated that the cost of services needed to aid the homeless
in New York City alone were expected to exceed $217 million in 1985.102
The most visible direct aid from the federal government at the shelter level
has been grants of government materials and facilities as a result of the efforts of the HHS Homeless Task Force. Created in 1983, the Task Force has
attempted to arrange the transfer of materials to shelter groups from several
federal agencies, most notably the Department of Defense ("DOD") and the
General Services Administration ("GSA"). The materials slated to be transferred so far have consisted mostly of surplus building space from the GSA
and DOD, and food from DOD commissaries. Unfortunately, this program
has been ineffective due to HHS mismanagement, with little actual help be10 3
ing rendered.
13. Mid-January, 1986: Filming starts for television movie about Mitch Snyder
and the CCNV shelter, starring Martin Sheen as Snyder. Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1986,
at BI, col. 1.
96. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 5, at 20.
97. Id.

98. Id. at 19.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 19-20.

102. Id. at 15.
103. The history of the HHS Homeless Task Force almost strains credulity regarding the
ineptitude with which the effort has been handled.
1. In fiscal 1984, the Department of Defense ("DOD") received eight million
dollars from Congress to renovate 600 potential sites for emergency shelters identi-
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"Least Restrictive Setting" and the McKinney Bill
On November 8, 1983, Representative Stewart B. McKinney introduced a
bill"° modifying the Public Health Service Act.10 5 The bill was aimed directly at alleviating the problem of homelessness among deinstitutionalized
mental patients. 1 16 Although the bill eventually died in committee, it was
subsequently reintroduced into the House1 "7 in March 1986. Although its
passage is still in doubt, the bill is worthy of further consideration because of
the generally favorable response originally accorded to the bill by the
press' 0 8 and because it has been drafted specifically with the mentally ill
homeless in mind.
The goal of the McKinney bill is to clarify the policy set down in the
Public Health Service Act by requiring that mental patients be treated in the
"optimum therapeutic setting."' 0 9 The present policy under section 9501 of
the Mental Health Systems Act is that a mental patient has a right to be
treated in the "least restrictive setting.""' The McKinney bill defines the
fled by the DOD from among vacant military facilities. Of the eight-million dollars,
only $900,000 was obligated for the repair of two facilities, the balance going to
maintain Army Reserve facilities. Since most of the eight-million dollars was not
spent, Congress allotted the DOD only $500,000 for the emergency shelter program
in fiscal 1985. (However, the DOD has promised to supplement the program from
elsewhere in its budget, if necessary.)
2. The Task Force also arranged with the DOD for the transfer of surplus food
from 195 military commissaries to the homeless. According to the records of the
Task Force, only 38 commissaries provided any amount of food. These contributions
were of such limited quantity that they were described in HHS records as "unknown" and "minimal."
3. Another agreement made by the Task Force with the DOD was to provide
vacant military warehouses to store emergency food. No military warehouses could
be identified as being put to this purpose.
4. The GSA promised to provide the Task Force with surplus federal buildings
for use as emergency shelters. Of 3,874 buildings that were surplus as of October 30,
1984, only three were under agreement for use as shelters.
H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 5, at 15-16.
104. H.R. 4330, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
105. Public Health Service Act, ch. 288, 37 Stat. 309 (1912) (codified as amended throughout 42 U.S.C.).
106. Rep. McKinney stated that:
It is evident that the implementation of our original deinstitutionalization goals
have been a failure at the very best. . . . I think in the rush to do right by the
mentally ill we have replaced the institutions with the cold sidewalks of the East Side
of New York and Southeast Washington.
Evans, supra note 7, at C6, col. 1.
107. H.R. 1479, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
108. Raspberry, ProvidingHelp After the Institution, Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 1983, at A19, col.
I.
109. H.R. 4330, supra note 104, at 1.
110. Mental Health Systems Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9501(a)(ii) (1982).
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"optimum therapeutic setting" as being: "The environment that is least restrictive of an individual's personal liberty and where the care, treatment,
habilitation, or rehabilitation is particularly suited to the level of services
necessary to properly implement an individual's treatment, habilitation, and
rehabilitation.""' The bill would require that mental patients be treated in
facilities where they would be provided with support services "appropriate
to such individual's level of functioning.""' 2 The practical effect of such a
treatment policy would be to intensify the scrutiny of release/treatment programs by emphasizing the placement of a patient in the "best" location for
the treatment of mental illness, rather than emphasizing the protection of
personal liberties suggested by the "least restrictive setting" standard.
Such a common-sense approach to deinstitutionalization certainly has appeal - attacking the problem at its perceived source, the treatment and release goals of state mental hospitals. However, this plan has not escaped
criticism. To some, the bill does not address the true problem with deinstitutionalization: the lack of community mental health centers. Rather, the
McKinney bill seeks to solve the problem of homelessness among former
patients by limiting the numbers that would be released instead of providing
for an aftercare support system that would allow more patients to be released. Norman Rosenberg, director of the Mental Health Law Project, criticized the bill because it would actually reduce the pressure on local
governments to develop appropriate community mental health facilities,113
with the result that the states would go back to relying on institutions for the
treatment of the mentally ill.' 1'
Although such criticism may be warranted, the McKinney bill does recognize that the availability of adequate out-patient mental health facilities
should be a factor in the decision for release. The bill provides:
Individuals who are discharged from, or are in need of placement
in, inpatient mental health facilities are informed of available community-based facilities and programs providing mental health
treatment and related support services, and provided access to a
sufficient number of adequately funded community-based facilities
and programs providing mental health and related support
services. 115

These requirements relate back to the considerations of "living safely in free11.
112.
113.
114.
115.

H.R. 4330, supra note 104, at 2.
Id.
Evans, supra note 7, at C6, col. 1.
Id.
H.R. 4330, supra note 104, at 2.
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dom" discussed in O'Connor.'16 Here, "optimum therapeutic setting"
would take into consideration the existence of adequate community support
systems that would enable the released patient to survive outside the institution and "avoid the hazards of freedom."' 17 While the McKinney bill shows
an appreciation for the necessity of providing an adequate aftercare support
structure in a release/treatment program, the spotty existence of community
mental health facilities could mean that a mental patient's O'Connor rights
to release could be restricted. Release would depend upon the existence of
adequate post-release support facilities in the area where he is to be released,
making him a prisoner to geography if his area has no acceptable system.
The Missing Element: Community Mental Health Centers
As has been previously noted, many of the problems associated with the
deinstitutionalization movement can be attributed to the lack of community
mental health centers available to provide guidance, counseling, and outpatient treatment needed by the mentally ill in the community."' With fewer
persons institutionalized because of restricted admissions to state mental
hospitals and the release of mental out-patients, 1 9 such centers are crucial
to the successful care and treatment of the mentally ill in the community. In
terms of this discussion, these centers represent a means to prevent the con116. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 564, 575 (1975). The Court in O'Connor also considered the necessity of an aftercare support structure of some type when making a release
decision: "In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing
responsiblefamily members or friends." Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 574 n.9.
118. The need for community mental health centers has emphatically been brought home
by the case of Joel Rabinowitz of Alexandria, Virginia. Diagnosed as schizophrenic in 1976,
he had been receiving psychiatric treatment and appeared to be making progress. However, in
January of 1985 he began to feel that he required more care than the outpatient treatment he
had been receiving. He checked into Alexandria Hospital, but was discharged after one night
because his condition was not considered acute enough to require hospitalization. This pattern
was to continue. Alexandria has few available facilities to provide a non-institutional
surpervised environment for the mentally ill not in immediate crisis, such as Joel. As of January 2, 1986, Joel has been shuttled between 14 facilities and is still not permanently placed. He
has been placed in a YMCA, an alcoholism detoxification center (although Joel has no alcohol
problem), jail, Western State Hospital after assaulting a nurse at Alexandria Hospital when he
was told that he would not be re-admitted, and a city-supervised apartment where, unfortunately, he caused a fire because of a smoking accident. At one point, while Joel was staying
with his parents, the Rabinowitz's were forced to have Joel arrested for trespassing in order to
create a "crisis" situation to get him immediate help. This episode landed Joel in jail for three
days, another stay at an alcholism detox center, and back to the YMCA. Jordan, After 14
Moves, Alexandria PsychiatricPatientStill Has No Home, Wash. Post, Jan. 2, 1986, at Cl, col.
1.
119. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 5, at 4.
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dition of homelessness among the mentally ill, not just alleviate the
symptoms.
The number of community mental health centers that have actually been
established is much lower than the projected need. Currently, fewer than
800 of the estimated 2000 centers needed to provide such care have been
established.1 2' This is not to suggest, however, that no new facilities are
coming into existence. Some communities have exhibited a newfound sensitivity to the problem of homelessness among the mentally ill due to irresponsible release and outpatient treatment programs. Recent developments in
the District of Columbia are a case in point. There, massive reductions of
the inmate population at St. Elizabeth's Mental Hospital (a drop from 1600
to 800 on-site patients)1 21 will be carried out only when appropriate mental
health facilities to handle these former patients have been created within the
community. 122
It is interesting to note the problems that have beset the District of Columbia effort to find neighborhood facilities to handle and care for these
released patients - community resistance to the placement of centers in
their neighborhood and the inability to find suitable low-cost residential facilities. Most of the facilities being set up in Washington, D.C. have had to
be placed in small homes situated in poor neighborhoods.123 As a result,
locations for facilities that have been found have been criticized because they
are situated in areas low in employment opportunities and other community
facilities, and because the sites selected are in dangerous or volatile neighborhoods.1 24 Additionally, there has been resistance to the placement of mental
health facilities in these neighborhoods. 125 This resistance should come as
no surprise, however, because from the inception of the deinstitutionalization movement it was forseen that communities would react adversely to the
suggestion that an outpatient facility for the mentally ill be placed in their
120. Id.
121. Evans, The District Plans Patient Cutbacks at St. Elizabeth's, Wash. Post, Nov. 19,
1985, at Al, col. 4.
122. Id. at A12, col. 2.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at Al, col. 4. In the case of restrictive zoning, the future impact of Cleburne
remains to be seen. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). In
that case Cleburne Living Center challenged a restrictive local ordinance that prevented them
from establishing a group home for the mentally retarded in a housing development.
Although the Court struck down the statute in question, they held that the mentally retarded
are not a "suspect classificiation," hence any law regarding the mentally retarded need only be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest to pass constitutional muster. This could open
the door to more restrictive zoning laws, ostensibly founded on legitimate interests, that could
prevent community mental health centers from being established.
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neighborhood. Ten years ago, Judge Bazelon remarked that a certain
amount of community backlash to the creation of community mental health
centers could be expected: "[i]t [the uproar over deinstitutionalization] provides a glimpse of the backlash that could be expected - from demands of
restrictive zoning laws to editorial demands for the establishment of "rural
havens" for the mentally disturbed. The solution sounds suspiciously like
the institutional refugees of the nineteenth century."' 2 6 While the reaction
has not been quite this virulent, one need only to refer back to the restrictive
zoning laws at issue in Cleburne for a case in point.
As with the shelter system, the federal government sees the establishment
of community mental health centers as a local problem. At present, there is
little direct participation in the establishment of such centers by the federal
government, although there are grants available from Health and Human
Services (the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health ("ADAMH") Block
127
Grant) to fund such centers through the states.
Initially, the federal government became directly involved in the funding
of community mental health centers with the passage in 1963 of the Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act. 128 The idea was to stimulate state and local contributions for the establishment of these centers by
making monies available directly to the programs being established, with the
goal of eventually phasing out federal participation. In the years following
the passage of the Act, Congress passed legislation that increased the scope
of the care offered beyond the mentally ill, eventually including drug and
alcohol treatment centers, and facilities for missing children. Federal funding grew from an initial figure of thirty million dollars in 1965, to a high of
$298 million in 1979.129 In 1981, the last year of the program before it was
repealed by the Reagan Administration, the federal outlay was $270 million,
with only twenty percent of that figure going to the chronically mentally
ill. 130
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981131 repealed most of the
existing provisions and amendments to the Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act and the subsequent Mental Health Systems Act of
126. Bazelon, supra note 86, at 907.
127. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 5, at 20.
128. Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Health Centers Construction Act of
1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (codified as amended throughout 20 U.S.C. and 42

U.S.C.).
129. M. BURT & K.
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73 (1985).

130. Id.
131. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (codified

as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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1980, 132 and replaced them with the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental
Health Block Grant ("ADAMH"). The Block Grant program made two
major changes to the then existing federal funding program. First, instead of
making direct payments of federal funds to the centers in question, the government makes these funds available to the state to spend in line with their
own priorities and programs. Second, the amount of federal money being
spent has decreased significantly. In the years immediately following the
establishment of the ADAMH Block Grant (1982-1984), the level of federal
spending decreased by twenty-two to twenty-six percent (in constant 1981
dollars) from the 1981 level. 33 Roughly fifty percent of the grant money is
spent on mental health programs, however; HHS has no data on the number
of homeless people benefitting from this funding.' 34
Surprisingly, these cuts in federal funding do not necessarily mean that
state mental health programs have suffered during the Reagan years. While
the overall amount of federal money available has been reduced, increased
state control over monies available has meant that the funds are being spent
more in line with state priorities.' 3 5 According to at least one commentator,
individual state priorities have always been somewhat more directed toward
the chronically mentally ill, which would include the mentally ill homeless,
than the wide range of populations served under the former federal program. 136 As a result of this focus upon programs designed for the chronically mentally ill, some have concluded that these individuals, and by
inclusion the mentally ill homeless, probably have not suffered greatly from
37
reductions in federal funds.'
It would appear that the federal government has little inclination to establish its own series of community mental health centers. The most that a
recent house report (which was very critical of the current administration's
effort on behalf of the homeless) was willing to suggest in terms of direct
federal participation in creating aftercare support facilities was to have the
National Institute of Mental Health formulate models of community mental
health centers, with no actual federal creation of such facilities.' 3 Additionally, the report suggested that Congress should appropriate funds for shelter
demonstration projects in order to study effective means of providing mental
health care at the shelter level. 139 More direct federal aid is not going to
132. Mental Health Systems Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9501(i)(a)(ii) (1982).
133. M. BURT & K. PiTTMAN, supra note 129, at 76.
134. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 5, at 20.
135. M. BURT & K. PiTTMAN, supra note 129, at 75.
136. Id. at 76.

137. Id. at 77.
138. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 5, at 29.
139. Id. at 30.
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happen during this Administration, given its stated position and the general
tightening of the federal budget. "" It is to the credit of Congress that it has
consistently appropriated more funding in the mental health area than the
Administration has requested. 4 '
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The most important factor in deriving a humane solution to the problem
of mentally ill homeless is the establishment of community mental health
centers to provide a support structure for those needing help, helping both
the released mental patient and the mentally ill who do not qualify for institutional care. Such centers are aimed at the prevention of homelessness, not
just the alleviation of the most visible symptoms. Additionally, the creation
of such centers would allow more liberal treatment/release programs
designed to protect the O'Connor rights of a mental patient regarding nonrestrictive treatment, absent a showing of dangerousness. This is not to say
that these programs should be implemented at the expense of the shelter
effort to provide for the immediate and pressing needs of the homeless; in
light of the realities of limited manpower and funds to devote to the plight of
the homeless, some hard choices might have to be made regarding government funding. Hopefully, private or local efforts will be able to compensate
where the need for shelter is great and funds are short. The key to establishing community mental health centers will be motivating federal, state and
local governments to coordinate efforts utilizing the resources that are on
hand, "4' 2 and to create new and as yet unfound resources in the community
itself. The increasing presence of the homeless within the community just
may be the pressure needed to rouse politicians and citizens to action at the
local level. Given the serious nature and size of the problems, finding a solution to homelessness is not just a priority, it is a necessity.
Gregory Taylor

140. Lerman notes that:
There has been a lack of interest at the federal level in allocating funds to significantly favor community over traditional placements in the [mental retardation] and
[mental illness] fields. The tendency instead has been for the federal government to
rhetoricize in favor of [deinstitutionalization], while leaving it to the States to deal as
best they can with issues of implementation.
P. LERMAN, supra note 2, at 89.
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142. "Given these disparate sources of operational policies and the absence of any central
'lead' agency within the federal government, it is not surprising that there is a clear lack of
consistent policy at the national level." P. LERMAN, supra note 2, at 12.

